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Abstract—Miniaturized satellites are currently not considered
suitable for critical, high-priority, and complex multi-phased
missions, due to their low reliability. As hardware-side fault
tolerance (FT) solutions designed for larger spacecraft can not
be adopted aboard very small satellites due to budget, energy, and
size constraints, we developed a hybrid FT-approach based upon
only COTS components, commodity processor cores, library IP,
and standard software. This approach facilitates fault detection,
isolation, and recovery in software, and utilizes fault-coverage
techniques across the embedded stack within a multiprocessor
system-on-chip (MPSoC). This allows our FPGA-based proof-
of-concept implementation to deliver strong fault-coverage even
for missions with a long duration, but also to adapt to varying
performance requirements during the mission. The operator of a
spacecraft utilizing this approach can define performance profiles,
which allow an on-board computer (OBC) to trade between
processing capacity, fault coverage, and energy consumption using
simple heuristics. The software-side FT approach developed also
offers advantages if deployed aboard larger spacecraft through
spare resource pooling, enabling an OBC to more efficiently handle
permanent faults. This FT approach in part mimics a critical
biological system’s ability to tolerate faults, adapt to permanent
failure, and enables graceful aging of an MPSoC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Satellite miniaturization has enabled a broad variety of
scientific and commercial space missions, which previously
were technically infeasible, impractical or simply uneconom-
ical. However, very small satellites such as nanosatellites and
sometimes even microsatellites (≤100kg) are currently not con-
sidered suitable for critical and complex multi-phased missions,
as well as high-priority science applications, due to their low
reliability. On-board computer (OBC) and related electronics
constitute a large part of such a spacecraft’s mass, yet these
components lack often even basic fault tolerance (FT) func-
tionality. Due to budget, energy, mass and volume restrictions,
existing FT solutions originally developed for larger spacecraft
can in general not be adopted. Nanosatellite OBCs also have
to cope with drastically varying workload throughout a mis-
sion, which traditional FT solutions can not handle efficiently.
Therefore, we developed a novel FT approach offering strong
fault coverage, which was implemented fully using only a single
FPGA with commodity processor designs, and library IP.
This architecture can protect generic applications with an
arbitrary structure, can adapt to varying performance require-
ments in longer multi-phased missions, and can adapt to a
shrinking pool of processing capacity similar to a biological
system, efficiently handling aging effects and accumulating per-
manent faults. As major parts of our approach are implemented
in or directly controlled by software, a spacecraft operator
can configure the OBC to deliver the desired combination of
performance, robustness, functionality, or to meet a specific
power budget. To offer strong fault detection, isolation and
recovery (FDIR), we combine software-side fault detection and
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mitigation and configuration scrubbing with various other FT
measures across the embedded stack, enabling strong, low-
cost FT with commodity hardware, while exploiting FPGA
reconfiguration to mitigate permanent faults.
The next two sections contain background information, and
a discussion of related work. In Section IV a brief overview
over the three stages of our approach is provided. Our proof-
of-concept OBC-design is described in Section V, with the
functionality of each FT-stage outlined in the subsequent sec-
tions. How this approach can improve efficiency of OBC in
spacecraft of all weight classes, spare resource utilization and
fault coverage, is discussed in Section IX. Section X, introduces
performance profiles allowing a system-on-chips (SoC) to trade
compute performance for energy efficiency, robustness, and
functionality at runtime. Our approach provides advantages to
spacecraft of all weight classes, and can be implemented also
within distributed systems, for which further applications and
improvements are discussed in Section XI.
Contributions:
• An architecture enabling software-side fault detection and
mitigation for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) MPSoCs and
FPGA-based systems, implementing the full FDIR cycle and
combining FT measures across the embedded stack.
• A practical solution to safely repurpose redundancies in an
OBC by exploiting mixed criticality, allowing spare resource
pooling, thereby increasing fault coverage capacity and re-
ducing the need for over-provisioning.
• Functionality allowing an OBC to deliver a runtime con-
figurable level of performance by dynamically trading fault
coverage, processing capacity, and energy consumption.
II. BACKGROUND
Tasks which would be handled by multiple dedicated payload
and subsystem processing systems aboard a larger satellite, are
usually handled by just one COTS-based command & data han-
dling system in nanosatellites. These utilize mobile-market and
embedded SoCs with one or more cores (MPSoCs), SDSoCs
[1], or FPGAs [2]. Due to manufacturing in fine technology
nodes, such chips offer superior efficiency and performance as
compared to space-grade OBC designs, but are also non-FT1.
These SoCs consist mostly of extensively tested and optimized
standard logic, reused, supported, and evolved continuously
by several industries and used daily by countless developers.
In contrast, most radiation-hard-by-design (RHBD) processors
cores, and SoCs manufactured in more robust manufacturing
processed (RHBM) are crafted almost artisanally at high cost by
few designers with little commercial stimulus for optimization.
Their cost, energy consumption and mass often exceed such a
spacecraft’s global power budget, total mass, and almost always
its overall project budget. Therefore, we developed a hybrid
1Exceptions to this rule received uncommonly abundant funding, are tech-
nology demonstration for FT concepts, or custom fail-over designs.
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FT-approach based upon only COTS components, library IP,
and existing software, instead of artisanal processor designs and
proprietary instruction set architectures.
Existing hardware voting based FT solutions are design-
time static and can tolerate a fixed number of failures within
a voter setup, which can not be changed at runtime. Critical
biological systems instead consist of independent, cooperating
cells or clusters of similar functionality with a high degree
of inherent redundancy and self-healing capabilities. Damage
to a single cell is compensated by the remaining cells, and a
complete breakdown of functionality occurs only due severe
damage to the system at a broader scale. Our approach combines
various FT techniques to mimic such behavior at the logic
and SoC level, through FPGA reconfiguration and software-
controlled thread migration within a globally share pool of
processor cores, enabling graceful aging. The replication level,
hence fault coverage capabilities, and various other parameters
can be adjusted at runtime, while spare capacity can be reused
to run background and lower-criticality applications instead of
remaining idle.
In low feature-size chips, the energy threshold above which
highly charged particles can induce faults in digital logic (single
event effects - SEE) decreases, while the ratio of events inducing
multi-bit upsets (MBU), and the likelihood of permanent faults
in logic and memory increases. Increased fault coverage of
hardware-FT based concepts on such chips through additional
FT-circuitry therefore implies diminishing returns, preventing
an application of traditional RHBD/RHBM concepts [3], [4]
to mobile-market SoCs. Total ionizing dose, however, becomes
less of a problem with finer technology nodes, and recent gen-
eration FPGAs also show decent latch-up performance [5], [6].
FPGAs have drastically improved FDIR potential [7] despite
being more vulnerable to transients, as radiation-induced upsets
in the running configuration can be corrected via reconfiguration
with differently routed configuration variants [8].
III. RELATED WORK
Fine-grained, non-invasive, and scalable fault detection in
FPGA fabric is challenging, and subject of ongoing research
[9], [10], and often is simply ignored [11]. Most FPGA-based
FT-concepts rely on error scrubbing, which has scalability
limitations for complex logic [9], [12], unless special-purpose
offline testing is utilized [13]. In the future, memory-based
reconfigurable logic devices (MRLDs) [14] may allow pro-
grammed logic to be protected like conventional memory, and
thus would drastically simplify fault detection. If manufactured
using phase/polarity-change memory instead of charge-based
technologies, MRLDs could further increase robustness, but
this technology is only today being productized. In this paper,
we thus present an approach to general-purpose FT computing
that compensates for faults across the embedded stack and
through partial FPGA reconfiguration. We realize fine-grained
fault detection at the software level, and perform scrubbing only
as an auxiliary measure in the background to increase robustness
of our SRAM-based FPGA platform.
Hardware voting today is used exclusively for protecting
simpler FT processor cores at the microcontroller level [4],
[15], and for accelerators [16] supporting application code with
tightly constrained program structure. Hence, the application of
this hardware-centered approach has become a technical dead-
end for protecting widely used application processor designs
intended for general-purpose computing, while accelerators by
themselves would only assure FT for computation and data
offloaded to such a device. In our research, however, we seek to
deliver strong fault coverage for general purpose computing, and
aim to efficiently protect even larger and more complex modern
application processors, such as those widely used in mobile
market and embedded devices. Mobile market processors can
run at gigahertz clock rates, for which hardware-side voting
or instruction-level lockstep are non-trivial, hence, hardware
voting approaches have been implemented only at lower clock
rates [15], [17], [18]. For comparison, today’s highly optimized
COTS library IP achieves clock speeds comparable to traditional
FT-processor designs on ASIC even on an FPGA, without
requiring manual fine-tuning. We instead utilize software-driven
coarse-grain lockstep to achieve fault detection, and maintain
consistency between cores, requiring no vast arrays of synchro-
nized voters, while utilizing COTS IP.
Thread migration has been shown to be a powerful tool
for assuring FT, but prior research ignores fault detection, and
imposed tight constraints on an application’s type and structure
(e.g., video streaming and image processing [11]). However, to
implement sophisticated and efficient thread migration, fault-
detection must be facilitated at the OS or application-level
without falling back to design space exploration. Coarse-grain
lockstep of weakly coupled cores can do just that, and in the past
has already been used for high availability, non-stop service, and
error resilience concepts. However, in prior research, faults are
usually assumed to be isolated, side effect free and local to an
individual application thread [19] or transient [20], [21], and
entail high performance [22] or resource overhead [23], [24].
More advanced proof-of-concepts [20], [25], however, attempt
to address these limitations, and even show a modest perfor-
mance overhead between 3% and 25%, but utilize checkpoint &
rollback or restart mechanics [20], which make them unsuitable
for spacecraft command & control applications.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW & REQUIREMENTS
Coarse-grain lockstep is one among several measures used
in our hybrid FT approach to facilitate forward-error-correction
(FEC) and deliver strong fault coverage. Our approach consists
of three fault mitigation stages:
Stage 1 utilizes coarse-grain lockstep for fault detection,
to generate a distributed majority decision between proces-
sor cores. Stage 1 utilizes time-triggered checkpoints to au-
tonomously resolved faults corrupting the state of applications,
and facilitate re-synchronization and thread migration in case
of repeated faults, enabling strong short-term fault coverage.
Stage 2 assures the integrity of programmed logic by inter-
facing with Stage 1 and functionality such as Xilinx SEM. Its
objective is to assure and recover the integrity of processor cores
and their immediate peripheral IP through FPGA reconfigura-
tion, thereby counteracting resource exhaustion.
Stage 3 handles resource exhaustion and re-allocates process-
ing time within the system to maintain stability of critical
applications and functionality in a degraded system.
The entire Stage1-3 form a closed cycle, which implements
FDIR in several steps as depicted in Figure 1. Additional
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Fig. 1: Stage 1 (white) implements a continuous checking loop,
which facilitates fault coverage through thread-level synchro-
nization and migration between tiles. Stage 2 (grey) can recover
faulty tiles using reconfiguration. In case of resource exhaustion,
Stage 3 adapts the thread allocation to best utilize the remaining
processing capacity.
implementation details on Stage 1’s thread-level coarse-grain
lockstep, beyond what is briefly described in Section VI is
available in [26].
In low-end nanosatellites (e.g. 1U CubeSats), Stages 1+3
can be implemented separately on a generic MPSoC, providing
a level of system-level robustness which otherwise would be
only be achievable through proprietary hardware-FT solutions.
For all other spacecraft, we complement this functionality
with a tiled MPSoC architecture for FPGA as outlined in the
next section, which allows the system to recover defective
tiles through reconfiguration, and enables it to more efficiently
handle permanent faults.
V. A DYNAMIC TILED MPSOC ARCHITECTURE
Figure 2 depicts a simplified and publicly reproducible
version of our MPSoC design. It follows a tiled architecture
with each tile containing a processor core, local interconnect,
and peripheral IP-cores and interfaces. A debug bridge allows
supervisor access to each tile, e.g., to perform introspection
for testing purposes or to trigger a reset. The only globally
shared resources are a set of redundant main memory controllers
and non-volatile (nv) data storage. Code in nv-memory can be
shared between tiles, while widely used DDR and SDRAM
controllers are too large to instantiate for each tile, and would
require an excessive number of I/O-pins. Hence, our MPSoC
architecture consists of isolated SoC-compartments accessing
shared main memory and operating system code, in contrast
to the conventional MPSoC designs, where cores share most
infrastructure and peripherals.
Our main platform is the commercial ARM Cortex-A53 ap-
plication processor core, which was chosen due to its flexibility,
wide-spread use in mobile-market MPSoCs and scalability. The
Xilinx Zynq Ultrascale+ SDSoC, also contains four discrete
A53 cores and is foreseen to launch in one of our main target
missions. The design outlined in this paper was facilitated using
Xilinx/Microblaze IP, and Microblaze-specific IP is replaced
with ARM equivalents. These are freely available as part of
the Xilinx IP-Library, and due to its maturity, flexibility, broad
OS support (for Linux, RTEMS, FreeRTOS), and are widely
availability. Hence both Microblaze and Cortex-A53 cores are
both solid choices for low-cost nanosatellite applications, with
a Cortex-A53 cores offering better absolute performance.
Each tile’s checkpoint-related information is stored in a
dedicated on-chip dual-port BRAM memory (validation mem-
ory) and exposed to other tiles, to allow low-latency informa-
tion exchange between tiles without requiring inter-tile cache-
coherence or access to main memory. Validation memory is
writable through the tile-local interconnect, and is read-only
accessible by other tiles.
The address space layout on each tile, including mapping
of tile-private peripherals and interfaces are identical. Each tile
can access its own main memory address segment, which is
mapped to the same address range on all tiles. Additionally,
main memory in its entirety (all memory segments) is read-
only accessible system wide, to simplify state synchronization
between tiles.
All tiles are equipped with the same interface configuration,
with controllers being mapped to identical locations in address
ranges. Hence, the address space layout is uniform across all
tiles in the system. Therefore, application code and data struc-
tures are portable between tiles, simplifying thread migration
drastically, and allowing direct re-use of many data structures.
Full replication of all interfaces across all tiles is not required,
but simplifies thread assignment and development manpower.
Tiles can be made aware of varying interface configurations
per tile to reduce the MPSoC’s footprint, fault potential, and
I/O pin count, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Caches, on-chip BRAM, and globally-shared memories are
ECC protected. Xilinx Library IP already offers SECDED
coding for on-chip BRAM and Microblaze caches, whereas
most recent Cortex cores foresee stronger ECC for caches. Main
memory is conventional DDRx-SDRAM with ECC, whereas
radiation-tolerant FeRAM [27] is used as nv-memory for oper-
ating system data and code, and COTS MLC-NAND-Flash for
data storage.
For nanosatellite missions to LEO, a variety of DDR memory
controllers with ECC support are available as part of stan-
dard vendor IP-libraries. For more deep-space and long-term
missions, stronger erasure coding should be used due to the
increased impact of SEEs and higher likelihood of MBU in
high-density SDRAM. Relevant well tested and proven con-
trollers implementing Reed-Solomon block coding are available
commercially, or can be assembled from generic ECC-IP and
standard controller cores2.
ECC-error syndromes generated within a tile, are handled
locally. Syndromes in validation memory generated due to
access by other tiles during a checkpoint are deferred and
processed after the checkpoint. Syndromes from globally shared
controllers can either be handled by the supervisor, or passed
through to all tiles and masked based on the related address;
this is a design decision. For simplicity, ECC syndromes in main
memory are passed on to the supervisor in our proof-of-concept.
2all necessary cores are available open-source e.g. from OpenCores
We implemented this MPSoC successfully on current genera-
tion Xilinx Zynq/Kintex and Virtex FPGAs with 4, 6 and 8 tiles.
Tiles can be placed on separate configuration partitions to enable
partial reconfiguration of individual tiles, without affecting the
rest of the system. A positive side effect of such floor planning
is a strong spatial separation of tile logic, thereby reducing the
likelihood of MBUs corrupting more than a single tile. Further
information on this implementation including floor planning,
and a detailed utilization report can be found in [28].
In [28], we also conducted a series of benchmarks of our
lockstep implementation to estimate the performance impact of
our approach. As the overhead of software-side FT measures
has been shown in literature to vary broadly between very low
3% and extreme 25%, we intentionally chose extreme param-
eters for our benchmark application and drastically increased
the checkpoint frequency to 20hz. For comparison, based on
radiation testing data for Xilinx Ultrascale FPGAs, we would
today consider checkpoint periods of once per second to once
ever 5 seconds reasonable in low-earth orbit. Note that we
intentionally chose to carry out benchmarking in user-land, not
within our RTOS/RTEMS-based implementation running bare-
metal. Our approach is interrupt and context-switch heavy, and
utilizes a considerable amount of thread-management calls. In
user-land, such operations imply one or multiple system calls
in addition to the actually executed function. This increases the
computational cost of such operations drastically as compared to
our actual bare-metal implementation, and was done on purpose
to add an additional margin for overhead, to achieve an upper
bound of our approach’s performance cost.
We deployed erasure coding based configuration error miti-
gation using Xilinx Soft-Error-Mitigation for Ultrascale FPGAs
(SEM) and supervisor-side scrubbing safeguard logic integrity.
However, SEM and scrubbing only address specific faults in
certain parts of an FPGA, and leave large parts of logic
unprotected. Therefore, the software-side functionality outlined
in the next sections closes this protective gap.
During a checkpoint, the state of a all threads mapped to
a tile is compared and synchronized with its siblings. To do
so, the checkpoint handler executes an application-provided
callback function for all pending threads, producing checksums
generated from thread-private data structures. Checksums are
stored in the tile’s local validation memory and thereby exposed
to the other tiles, and then compared with the other tiles in the
system. In case of disagreement, the tile signals disagreement
with that sibling and executes synchronization callbacks for all
affected threads. If necessary, it then also executes relevant
update callbacks and then resumes application execution. We
published an in depth description of these mechanics as well as
benchmark results for an astronomical application in [26].
VI. STAGE 1: SHORT-TERM FAULT MITIGATION
The objective of Stage 1 is to detect and correct faults within
a tile, and assure a consistent system state through checkpoint-
based FEC. It is implemented as sets of tiles running two
or more copies of application threads (siblings) in lock step.
Checkpoints interrupt execution, facilitating the lockstep and
enforcing synchronization, allowing thread assignment within
the system to be adjusted if required, as depicted in Figure 1.
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Fig. 2: A high-level topology diagram of our tiled MPSoC
architecture with memory controllers highlighted in yellow, and
interconnect-logic in blue. A debug-bridge on each tile allows
supervisor access. Access to each tile’s validation memory is
possible read-only through the global interconnect.
This approach enables us to utilize application intrinsics to
assess the health state of the system without requiring in-depth
knowledge about the application code. The supervisor just reads
out the results of the tiles’ decentralized consistency decision.
Threads can be scheduled and executed in an arbitrary order
between two checkpoints, as long as their state is equivalent
upon the next checkpoint.
We avoid thread synchronization issues due to invasive lock-
step mechanics [25] by merely reusing existing OS functionality
without breaking existing ABI contracts. Therefore, we can con-
tinue relying upon pre-existing synchronization mechanics such
as POSIX cancellation points3 and their bare-metal equivalents
(e.g., RTEMS_NO_PREEMPT in RTEMS’s Classic API if used
instead of newlib or the POSIX API). Stage 1 can even deliver
real-time guarantees, and the tightness of the RT guarantees
depends upon the time required to execute application call-
backs. In our RTEMS/POSIX-based implementation, we utilize
priority-based, preemptive scheduling with timeslicing, allowing
threads to delay checkpoints until they reach a viable state for
checksum comparison.
Checkpoints are time triggered, but can also be induced by the
supervisor through an interrupt e.g. to signal that new threads
have been assigned. Thus, the OS only has to support interrupts,
timers, and a multi-threading capable scheduler. To the best of
our knowledge, such functionality is available in all widely used
RT- and general purpose OS implementations.
A fault resolved during a checkpoint may cause the affected
tile to emit incorrect data through I/O interfaces, an inherent
limitation to coarse-grain lockstep [20]. For many very small
nanosatellite missions this is acceptable, as the use of COTS
components requires incorrect I/O to be sanitized anyway. In
contrast, larger spacecraft already utilize interface replications
or even voting, usually requiring considerable effort at the
interface level to facilitate this replication. Our approach com-
bined with the previously described MPSoC architecture inher-
3e.g. sleep, yield, pause, for further details, see IEEE Std 1003.1-2017 p517
ently provides interface-level replications by design, no longer
requiring extra measures to be taken. Additional protection
is therefore only needed for space applications where non-
propagation of incorrect I/O is required but interface replica-
tion is undesirable, i.e., due to PCB-space constraints aboard
CubeSats or unchangeable subsystem requirements. For packet-
based interfaces such as Spacewire, AFDX, CAN, or Ethernet,
no hardware-side solution is necessary, as data duplication can
be managed more efficiently at OSI layer 2+. This approach
today is widely used as part of real-time capable FT-networking
[29]. Other interfaces like I2C and SPI allow a simple majority
decision per I/O line, which can be implemented on-chip
through FIFO buffers, as the remaining on-tile interfaces have
low pin count and run at relatively low clock frequencies.
VII. STAGE 2: TILE REPAIR & RECOVERY
Stage 1 can not reclaim defective tiles, eventually resulting
in resource exhaustion. Therefore, in this stage, we recover
defective tiles through reconfiguration to counter transients in
FPGA fabric. To do so, the supervisor will first attempt to
recover a tile using partial reconfiguration. Afterwards, the
supervisor validates the relevant partitions to detect permanent
damage to the FPGA (well described in, e.g., [30]), and executes
self-test functionality on the tile to detect faults in the tile’s
main memory segment and peripherals. If unsuccessful, the
supervisor can repeat this procedure with differently routed
configuration variants, potentially avoiding or repurposing per-
manently defective logic.
As tiles are placed along partition borders in our MPSoC
architecture, tiles can be recovered in the background without
interrupting the rest of the system. The supervisor can also
attempt full reconfiguration implying a full reboot of all tiles.
Further details on reconfiguration and error scrubbing with a
microcontroller-based proof-of-concept implementation for a
nanosatellite are available in [31]. If both partial- and full-
reconfiguration are unsuccessful and all spare resources have
been exhausted, Stage 3 is utilized to assure a stable system
core to enable operator intervention.
VIII. STAGE 3: APPLIED MIXED CRITICALITY
Stage 3 autonomously maintains system stability of an aged
or degraded OBC. When considering a miniaturized satellite’s
OBC, we can differentiate individual applications or parts of
flight software by criticality. At the very least, we will find
software essential to a satellite’s operation, e.g. platform control
and commandeering, as well as other applications of various
levels of lower criticality. If the previous stages no longer have
enough spare processing capacity or tiles to compensate the
loss of a tile, this stage utilizes thread-level mixed criticality to
assure stability of core OBC functions. To do so, it can sacrifice
lower criticality tasks in favor of providing compute resources
to reach the desired replication level for critical threads.
Dependability for higher-criticality threads efficiently can be
maintained by reducing compute performance or reliability of
lower-criticality applications. Lower-criticality tasks may be
executed less frequently or on fewer tiles, thereby reducing
functionality or fault coverage for these tasks, retaining re-
sources for higher-criticality threads. This decision is taken
autonomously, and the operator can then define a more resource
conserving satellite operation schedule at a spacecraft level, e.g.,
sacrifice link capacity, or on-board storage space, to make best
use of the OBC in its degraded state.
IX. SPARE RESOURCE POOLING
This FT approach enables FT even for very small satellites,
but provides benefits for spacecraft of all weight classes. To in-
crease fault coverage in traditional hardware voting FT systems,
additional cores and spares must be provisioned, while compute
performance can be increased by utilizing faster processors
cores and adding more hardware voting instances. This is done
at design time, requiring over-provisioning, and can not be
changed throughout a mission. Cores are hardwired to a specific
instance, therefore, an instance will degrade once its spares are
exhausted, even if idle spares were available elsewhere.
In contrast, our approach is not based on hardwired voting
instances, as applications are mapped to a global pool of tiles
with a given replication level. In principle, our approach does
utilize spare resources too, but spare tiles do not differ from
conventional tiles in any way. Hence, spare tiles do not have to
remain idle, and unused processor capacity becomes a spare
resource that can be re-purposed. Thus, the fault coverage
capabilities of the system are no longer dependent on the
distribution and location of permanent faults within the system,
increasing overall robustness.
As applications can be migrated between tiles, low critical-
ity threads and background tasks can be assigned to utilize
free spare capacity. These lower-criticality threads can be de-
scheduled in favor of higher-criticality applications, if needed.
Spare capacity can also be used to increase FT for threads,
which usually would be executed without majority voting or
separately due to resource constraints. We can distribute a
defective tile’s workload to other tiles, to best take advantage
of the remaining system resources.
The best target tiles and to-be-evicted threads are not deter-
mined ad-hoc, but before a fault actually occurs, to reduce the
time spent in a checkpoint. We can maintain one replacement
strategy for every tile, due to the low tile and thread counts
common in space applications today4. Subsequent to a fault,
these strategies are recomputed to consider the now reduced
processing capacity of the system. As thread assignments are not
controlled by the supervisor, but only adjusted, threads may exit,
fork or create new child threads. Therefore, an update to adjust
these strategies to the currently running threads is also triggered
based on the fault counter mechanics of Stage 2. Even if a fault
occurs immediately after the current checkpoint, these strategies
will only be needed at the next checkpoint. Therefore, this is a
background operation which can be handled by the supervisor,
allowing the OBC to resume processing immediately.
Figure 3 depicts a six tile MPSoC running four applications
of different criticality. A fault has occurred in tile 3, which has
been marked as permanently defective, and there are multiple
recovery solutions:
• Affected threads could be relocated to a tile running lower-
criticality applications, replacing them as depicted in Figure
3a. For example, the threads previously run on tile 3 can be
4Manycore systems would allow too many combinations, but they will not
be applied to on-board data handling in the foreseeable future.
migrated to tile 6, replacing lower criticality thread-copies
previously run there. This requires tile 6 to copy the state
of its newly assigned threads from tile 1 or 2, at the cost
of executing the lower-criticality applications redundantly
instead of with majority voting.
• Instead of entirely de-scheduling one instance of each lower
criticality threads, the clock frequency on two tiles could
be increased, allowing one of each high-criticality thread to
be migrated. In Figure 3b, this is depicted by moving the
threads from the failed tile to tiles 5 and 6 without de-
scheduling instances of the low criticality threads. This is
possible as coarse-grain lockstep only requires an equivalent
state between siblings upon reaching a checkpoint and no
cycle-accurate synchronization. Most modern embedded and
mobile-market cores support frequency scaling.
• Another possibility would be to instead increase the clock
frequency of just one tile, if sufficient additional processing
capacity can be made available that way.
• Finally, in contrast to increasing the clock frequencies of
individual tiles, tile 4-6’s schedulers could also assign less
processing time to the lower-criticality tasks as shown in
Figure 3c. Due to timing implications for real-time appli-
cations, this may only be possible for sporadic tasks, and
background applications, which do not require a fixed amount
of processing time. Also, to guarantee equivalent work is
conducted for the medium and lower-criticality threads, the
schedulers on 3 instead of just 2 tiles would require adjust-
ment, wasting processing capacity in Tile 4 and 6. However,
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Fig. 3: A 6-tile MPSoC running 4 threads of mixed criticality
(Essential, High, Medium, and Low), where tile 3 (yellow)
suffered a hard fault. To retain majority voting for the higher
criticality threads, different recovery strategies can be facilitated
through, without directly requiring spares.
during this idle time, Tile 4 could be deactivated to reduce
energy consumption.
The ideal recovery strategy, depends on the current performance
requirements towards the OBC. Additional thoughts on this
aspect are discussed, e.g., in [11], where different replacement
strategies are described at a more mathematical level for video
streaming applications. In the next section, we therefore discuss
a heuristic approach to find near-best solutions to calculate
this decision autonomously and rapidly, considering different
performance requirements.
X. ADAPTING TO VARYING MISSION REQUIREMENTS
The approach described in the previous sections allows an
OBC to meet a desired power budget, maximize fault coverage,
processing power, or even functionality. Hence, the spacecraft
can better fulfill its scientific or commercial mission, and
increase the spacecraft’s lifetime. Theoretically, all we need to
do is find the ideal set of thread mappings which fulfill our
desired trade-off between processing capacity, FT, and minimal
energy consumption. These three performance objectives can be
visualized as depicted in Figure 4, and viable mappings can be
found in the inner area outlined in red.
These three objectives oppose each other, and fully dynamic
performance optimization at runtime is non-trivial and costly.
Computer science usually approaches such issues with compu-
tationally expensive optimization algorithms to find the ideal
solution, or design space exploration to find a large set of near-
best and chose the optimal solution either at runtime [11] or
design time [32]. The latter defeats the purpose of run-time
flexibility and adjustment. While design space exploration at
runtime is infeasible due to the limited processing capacity of a
supervisor, unless tight constraints are placed upon applications
regarding structure and functionality [11]. In practice, however,
we do not have to find the singular “best possible" solution
when recovering from a fault, instead we just need a “good
enough" solutions yielded by a heuristic algorithm [33]. Once
the system has been stabilized, ample time will be available to
further optimize the thread mapping and usually this is done by
the operator or flight software.
To facilitate a heuristic approach, we first reduce these three
competing objectives to a set of performance profiles, examples
of which are given in Table 5. In each profile, criticality classes
(essential - low) are assigned one or multiple execution modes:
separate, redundant, majority voting, or with more cores, e.g.,
to enable Byzantine voting (referred to as NMR, TMR, DMR
and separate in Table 5). Duplicate assignments allow threads
to be mapped in either mode, to enable mode reduction in
case of resource constraints. For example, when running in
the robustness profile, essential applications are always assigned
the desired number of cores, while high-criticality applications
are at least TMRed (depending on available resources). Other
applications are preferably executed TMRed, but may be exe-
cuted also DMR to retain fault detection, in case of resource
exhaustion, instead of entirely de-scheduling lower criticality
threads. Depending on mission requirements, the operator can
then select the most suitable performance profile from a set of
pre-generated at runtime, or could draft a new one.
To map threads, we build a new mapping for a task using the
strongest desired execution mode. We evaluate if this exceeds
Fault Coverage
Speed Energy
Fig. 4: An MPSoC utilizing the presented approach can trade
speed, energy efficiency, and fault coverage at run-time. We
utilize performance profiles for each objective to facilitate a
heuristic solution, to approximate the “best possible" set of
thread-mapping in the highlighted area.
the available power budget (energy profile) or processing
capacity. If so, we begin reducing the execution mode of tasks
beginning with the last mapped and therefore lowest-criticality
thread. If successful, we append the mapped thread to a list
and proceed with the next thread. To minimize the amount of
de-scheduled and mode reduced threads, we can sort threads of
same criticality based on required processing capacity. Thereby,
computationally expensive threads are reduced in execution
mode first, freeing up larger amounts of processing resources.
If not all threads could be mapped, we can de-schedule lower-
threads exceeding the compute capacity, energy constraints, or
allocate less processing time to specific applications system.
If no further mode or processing time reductions due to
RT-guarantees are possible, we abort mapping, and re-traverse
the list increasing execution mode, thereby undoing mode
reductions due to the previous reduction steps. The supervisor
itself only has to execute the latter part of this algorithm and
perform mode and processor time reduction, or de-schedule the
lowest criticality threads. It does not have to actually generate
all these mappings as it does not enforce thread assignment in
the system and only intervenes if necessary.
This algorithm also provides all mechanics necessary to
minimize the amount of active processor cores, and as threads
can be concentrated to as few tiles as possible, maximizing the
number of clock-gated cores. Individual tasks could also signal
preference for reduced processing instead of a mode reduction
as the approach itself is computationally inexpensive.
XI. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER APPLICATIONS
We implemented the MPSoC architecture described in Sec-
tion V using Xilinx Kintex and Virtex FPGAs as well as the
Zynq SDSoC platform [1], as these are relevant for our target
Mode Speed Energy Robustness Function
NMR
TMR
DMR
Separate
- - - -
E H M L
- H M L
- - - L
- - - -
E H M -
- - M L
- - - L
E H - -
- H M L
- - M L
- - - -
E H - -
E H M L
- - M L
- - - L
Fig. 5: Performance profiles with threads of different criticality
levels (Essential, High, Medium, Low) being assigned different
replication levels to enable fault detection or different voting
configuration through thread replication.
missions. However, for larger satellite platforms, this approach
and architecture could very well be implemented on ASIC,
and we see this as a “big-space" variant of our approach. An
ASIC implementation would have lower energy consumption,
and allow higher clock rates due to tighter timing and shorter
paths, and be less susceptible to transient faults. If manufactured
in an inherently radiation hardened technology such as FD-
SoI [34], the system as a whole would be considerably more
resistant to transient faults. Stage 2 would then be reduced to
testing and validate tiles, while not longer being able to recover
faulty tiles containing defective logic, but strong fault coverage
of SEEs would be improved due to RHBM.
Overall, an FPGA implementation offers stronger FDIR capa-
bilities, better coverage for permanent faults, and high flexibility
at low cost, while the ASIC variant could offer better system
performance and radiation tolerance due to RHBM. Custom
ASIC development of course is expensive and time-consuming,
thus, the resulting implementation would not be a viable solu-
tion for most miniaturized satellite applications, and therefore
not in the scope of this technology development project.
The relaxed cost, energy, and size constraints aboard larger
spacecraft allow an implementation of our approach spanning
multiple FPGAs. Compared to a single-chip implementation,
a multi-FPGA MPSoC variant offers better scalability due to
easier routing, can tolerate chip-level defects, and SEFIs to the
globally shared memory controllers, these can be distributed to
different FPGAs. Replicated thread-instances could then also
be distributed across FPGAs, offering non-stop operation while
one of the FPGAs undergoes full reconfiguration. However, our
proof-of-concept is focused on a single-FPGA based prototype
for nanosatellite use.
Our project is focused on payload data handling and platform
control for miniaturized spacecraft, and therefore application
to accelerator cores supporting computational offloading is not
explicitly considered in our research. Nonetheless, it would be
very well imaginable to also protect accelerator systems using
this approach, yielding at least similar benefits. As the structure
and type of applications usually executed on accelerators is
tightly constrained as compared to general purpose platform
control. Especially synchronization for real-time applications
and the impact of live-migration between tiles or state-updates
on a faulty tile, become much simpler if fully deterministic
application behavior is assumed, as would be the case for
computational offloading. While our project is entirely focused
on general-purpose computing instead of acceleration and com-
putational offloading, it would be intriguing to explore this
aspect further.
Our existing MPSoC design utilizes an AXI interconnect, but
we are currently reworking our MPSoC to instead use a NoC
between tiles and shared memory controllers. The existing in-
terconnect implementation allows low-latency communication,
but has a large footprint, and is difficult to route5 for larger tile
counts (without optimization, we successfully placed 8 tiles). A
NoC instead allows not only better scalability and easier routing,
but also enables the implementation of a broad variety of FT
concepts such as [35].
5We can still achieve a functional implementation meeting timing constraints
at several hundred megahertz, but the interconnect PBlock becomes dispropor-
tionately large.
Tiles have direct read-only access to another tile’s memory
segment to allow rapid thread migration and allow real-time
capacity. However, direct access to shared main memory is not
necessary to facilitate Stages 1-3. The data exchange required
to facilitate thread migration could very well be implemented
using IPC or through sockets, when considering complex net-
worked architectures. In distributed systems, our approach could
thus manage threads across multiple nodes sharing data when
required, at the cost of higher latency.
We developed this approach to guarantee FT for opaque
threaded applications on POSIX-compatible RTOS and general
purpose operating systems such as RTEMS and Linux.
However, the same functionality can also be applied to
virtualized, voted systems and to runtime based platforms. It
would be very well imaginable to implement Stage 1 within
MicroPython or a hypervisor, and instead vote on Python
scripts or virtual machines.
XII. CONCLUSIONS
To the best of our knowledge, the on-board computer
(OBC) design presented in this paper is the first practical,
non-proprietary, and affordable fault tolerance (FT) approach
suitable even for very small spacecraft. It offers strong fault
coverage, using just commercial-off-the-shelf hardware, library
IP, and commodity processor cores, requiring only a single
FPGA and a microcontroller based supervisor. The software-
side FT approach outlined in Stage 1 is non-invasive to appli-
cations and the OS, therefore existing software can be reused
and extended easily, while retaining real-time capabilities. The
research presented in this paper covers the entire FDIR loop,
and does not ignore or make unrealistic assumptions regarding
fault detection.
Our approach enables the re-use of existing development
tools and IP designed for mass-produced mobile-market appli-
cations, taking an important step towards departing from the
artisanal development approach in today’s space computing.
Instead of requiring new technologies to be re-invented con-
stantly and maintained at high cost, the FT mechanics presented
in this paper are flexible, which can adapt and grow with
the development of computer and processor technology. We
implemented this design on recent-generation Xilinx Virtex
and Zynq/Kintex Ultrascale+ FPGAs with less than 2W power
consumption (6 tiles on Kintex XCKU5P) and validated the
approach through fault injection.
We do not just enable FT for a satellite class which today
is considered unreliable, but also enhance the fault coverage
capabilities of OBCs in larger spacecraft, and other applica-
tions with similar constraints and fault profile. Our approach
facilitates majority voting through dynamic, replicated thread
groups mapped to the available processor cores dynamically
at runtime, instead of hardwiring them. Thus, all processing
capacity, including spares, are part of a shared resource pool.
Therefore, spare resources can be used more efficiently, and
allowing idle compute capacity to be used productively until it
is needed for fault coverage. An OBC running the presented
hybrid hardware-software FT approach can adapt to varying
mission requirements regarding adjusting the OBC transparently
at run-time, trading processing capacity for reduced energy
consumption or increased fault coverage.
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